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Case No. 20060416-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Michael W. Dennis,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the officers exceed the permissible scope of the stop by questioning the
driver about his earlier presence in an area frequented by drug dealers?
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed
for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004
UT 95, 1 15,103 P.3d 699. The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed
for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 P.3d 1222.

2. Was the officer justified in conducting a roadside search of defendant's
coin purse, where drug paraphernalia was found in the truck, defendant made
furtive gestures in his pocket, and defendant smelled of marijuana smoke?
Standard of Review. Same as in issue 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant

was

arrested

and

charged

with

(1)

possession

of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute by a restricted person, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004); (2) possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute by a restricted person, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (West 2004); (3) unlawful
possession of a schedule I or schedule II narcotic by a restricted person, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West 2004); and
(4) possession of drug paraphernalia by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). R. 1-2. Defendant was
released after posting bond, but after he failed to appear for a scheduled proceeding,
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a bench warrant was issued for defendant's arrest. R. 10-13. Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence seized. See R. 14-17. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 14-17. Defendant filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal and this court granted the petition. See R. 19-20,26-27; Order
dated June 12,2006.
B.

SUMMARY OF FACTS 1

At 3:00 a.m. on October 18, 2005, Officers Trent Anderson and Lynn
Archuletta were parked "car-to-car," facing opposite directions, at the front entrance
of a local business in Helper City. R. 37: 4-5, 22 (R. 14). As the two officers
conversed, Officer Anderson saw a black pickup truck slow to approximately five
miles per hour at a stop sign down the street, then proceed through the intersection
without stopping. R. 37: 5-6 (R. 14). As the pickup truck then proceeded past the
officers on State Road 6 (SR6), Officer Anderson saw a crack in the windshield. R.
37:5,22 (R. 14). Officer Archuletta had seen the truck about two hours earlier at the
Riverside Motel— an area local police "were dealing with on an almost daily basis
with narcotics users and dealers". R. 37: 6, 22, 31, 38-39 (R. 14). Some seventeen
felony drug arrests had been made at that location. R. 37: 22, 31.

The facts are taken from the suppression hearing and Officer Anderson's
video of the stop, which was played at the suppression hearing and is part of the
record on appeal. The video is cited with a "V" followed by the time as reflected in
the video, e.g., V3:06:02. Parenthetical citations refer to the trial court's findings on
the matter as set forth in its Order on Motions to Suppress, R. 14-17, a copy of which
is included in the Addendum.
3

As Officer Anderson prepared to leave to initiate a traffic stop, Officer
Archuletta advised him that he had seen the truck earlier at the motel. R. 37: 6 (R.
14). Officer Anderson pulled out of the parking lot, activated his red and blue
lights, and stopped the truck about a half mile down the road. R. 37: 6-7,12, 22;
V3:06:02 (R. 15). He recognized both occupants in the truck: Brian Straugh, the
driver, and defendant Mike Dennis, the passenger. R. 37: 6-7 (R. 15). Officer
Anderson had dealt with both in the past and was aware that they had been
involved in drugs and burglaries or thefts. R. 37: 7,18-19.
After obtaining Straugh's driver's license, registration, and insurance
documents, Officer Anderson returned to his patrol car. R. 37: 7,15; V3:07:40. He
requested assistance from Officer Archuletta and attempted to run a computer
check. R. 37: 7,23 (R. 15). Officer Archuletta arrived shortly thereafter. R. 37: 7 (R.
15). When Officer Anderson could not establish a link on the computer, he
requested that dispatch run the checks. R. 37:7-8,15 (R. 15). While they waited for
dispatch to run the checks, Officer Archuletta told Officer Anderson that when he
saw Straugh at the motel, "they were up fixing something underneath and doing
something there at the driver's door." V3:13:42. After an eight minute wait,
dispatch reported that the license and vehicle information was valid and that there
were no outstanding warrants. R. 37: 7-8,15; V3:07:40-3:15:20 (R. 15).
The two officers returned to the pickup truck, Officer Anderson approaching
at the driver side door and Officer Archuletta approaching at the passenger side
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door. R. 37: 7-8; V3:15:30 (R. 15).2 Officer Anderson asked Straugh about his
activities and purpose at the Riverside Motel. R. 37:16-17; V3:15:37 (R. 15). While
conversing with Straugh, Officer Anderson observed an unhooked stereo amplifier
on the floor and asked Straugh what it was for. R. 37:8; v3:16:18-23. The amplifier
raised his suspicions because both men had been involved in burglaries or thefts in
the past and amplifiers are usually hooked up. R. 37: 9,16,20,26.
Officer Archuletta also saw the unhooked amplifier on the floorboard. R. 37:
25-26. But in addition, he saw some Zig-Zag rolling papers, commonly used to roll
marijuana cigarettes, on the armrest of the driver side door. R. 37: 9,25,29,36-37.
Officer Archuletta alerted Officer Anderson to the rolling papers. R. 37: 9,13, 29.
When Officer Anderson looked down to see them, he also saw a tubular, bright
green object lying underneath them, which he believed to be a "narcotic
paraphernalia item/' R. 37: 9,26; V3:17:39 (R. 15). He asked Straugh what it was,
indicating that " it looks like a marijuana pipe/ 7 V3:17:49. After a brief discussion
about the pipe, Officer Anderson asked Straugh to step out of the vehicle so that he
could retrieve the paraphernalia. R. 37: 9; V3:19:05 (R. 15)
Straugh exited and walked to the back of the truck, where Officer Anderson
frisked him for weapons. V3:19:ll-19:50. Finding no weapons, Officer Anderson

2

Officer Archuletta originally believed that he had approached the pickup
truck and spoke with the occupants while Officer Anderson waited at his patrol car
for the license and vehicle checks. R. 37: 23,29. However, after viewing the video
tape of the incident, recorded from Officer Anderson's vehicle, he acknowledged
that the two officers approached the vehicle together. R. 37: 35; video.
5

returned to the driver side door and, after receiving permission from Straugh,
retrieved the rolling papers. V3:19:52, Officer Anderson then asked defendant what
was in his black bag. V3:20:08. Defendant said he had his "money and stuff like
that/ 7 V3:20:12. Apparently, he also denied having any drugs in the bag, to which
Officer Anderson replied, "Well, let's pull the dog out and see." V3:20:16.
Defendant responded to "pull the dog out." V3:20:18. Officer Anderson then shined
his flashlight into the car and saw on the floorboard small plastic baggies, which are
also common with narcotics usage. R. 37: 9; V3:20:25 (R. 15). After asking Straugh
about the plastic baggies, Straugh retrieved them for the officer and told him they
were for speaker parts. R. 37: 9; V3:20:25. Straugh then returned to the back of the
truck and Officer Anderson questioned him further. V3:20:35-21:32.
Officer Anderson returned to the driver side door of the pickup truck and
looked inside with the aid of his flashlight. V3:21:33. Then, Officer Anderson
engaged in a brief conversation with defendant about his connection to the
paraphernalia and evasive behavior:
Officer Anderson: Mike, you know what, you've been convicted of
dope before. Okay? Don't try to fool us.
Defendant:

I ain't done nothing. That's what I'm saying.

Officer Anderson: I've been finding all kinds of paraphernalia in
here.
Defendant:

[unintelligible]... a ride home."

Officer Anderson: Well, obviously, you're being evasive about
something, Mike.

6

V3:21:42. Officer Anderson, as well as Officer Archuletta, conversed with defendant
for a few more seconds, in which they discussed, among other things, the officer's
belief that defendant was "involved in the game" and the presence of the "rolling
papers/ 7 V3:21:56. Officer Anderson then returned to the back of the pickup truck,
where he further questioned Straugh and even asked that he show him how he used
the rolling papers. V3:22:23-24:12.
Meanwhile, Officer Archuletta continued to question defendant. Defendant
would not look at Officer Anderson when he talked to him. R. 37:10. But when
Officer Archuletta engaged in conversation with him, defendant became defensive.
R. 37: 10. At some point during their conversation, Officer Archuletta saw
defendant, who was still seated in the truck, move "a black looking basket weave
leather" object from one side of the pocket of his hoody to the other side. R. 37:2425 (R. 15). Knowing that defendant was a "convicted felon," and concerned that the
black object could be a knife handle, gun handle, or a gun holster, Officer Archuletta
asked defendant what it was, but defendant would not tell him. R. 37:24-25,28,37.
Officer Archuletta asked defendant to take his hands out of his pocket, but again,
defendant refused. R. 37: 24, 27-28.3

3

Officer Archuletta testified that officers are trained that when they suspect
someone is armed, the first thing they should do is to instruct the suspect to show
his or her hands, not ask if they have a weapon. R. 37: 28.
7

Officer Anderson returned to the driver side door.

V3:24:10.

Officer

Archuletta asked defendant to "prove me wrong/ 7 V3:24:17. Officer Anderson
asked defendant whether he had any weapons on him. V3:24:19. Officer Archuletta
then asked defendant to exit the pickup truck so that he could search him for
weapons and Officer Anderson likewise told defendant to "come on out/7 R. 37: 9,
24,39; V3:24:21. Because the passenger side door would not open, defendant exited
through the driver side door and was escorted to the rear of the vehicle next to
Straugh. R. 37: 9-10; V3:24:33.
As defendant walked back to the rear of the truck, he placed his hand back
into his pocket. R. 37:10; V3:24:39. Officer Anderson told defendant three times to
take his hand out of his pocket before he removed his hand. R. 37: 10; V3:24:40.
Officer Anderson then asked him to place his hands behind his back so he could
"pat him down" for weapons. R. 37:10. As he patted him down, Officer Anderson
could smell "a real pugnant odor of marijuana" on defendant's person. R. 37: 10.
During the pat down, Officer Archuletta removed the black object from defendant's
pocket and discovered that it was a small black leather coin purse. R. 37: 26-27;
V3:25:18. Officer Archuletta then opened the coin purse and discovered "some
marijuana, some methamphetamine, and some pills." R. 37: 10-11, 26; V3:25:21.
Officer Anderson then handcuffed defendant and a further search of his pockets
uncovered marijuana pipes in his pockets. R. 37:11; V3:25:25.
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After taking defendant into custody, the officers searched the pickup truck.
R, 37:11. Officer Anderson retrieved the baggies on the floorboard and additional
baggies under the "boot shifter77 of the stick shift. R. 37:11. All of the baggies were
empty but one, which contained a large rock consistent with crystal
methamphetamine. R. 37:11.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Scope of Detention. Defendant contends that the officers7 questioning of
the driver and defendant was not permissible because the officers did not observe
the paraphernalia or amplifier until after their inquiry into drugs began. Contrary
to defendant's claim, the officers were justified in questioning the men about drug
use. The officers knew both men had histories of drug involvement, the pickup
truck they were driving was just two hours earlier in a location frequented by drug
dealers, and the men were seen doing something at the driver's door—a place
where drugs are often concealed. These facts supported a reasonable suspicion
justifying the officers7 questioning the men about drugs.
II. Coin Purse Search. Defendant also contends that the search of the coin
purse was not justified as a weapons search. The State agrees. However, following
the frisk, the officers had probable cause to believe that defendant was concealing
drugs and that he was using or in possession of drugs. Mere presence in a car for
which there is probable cause is not sufficient to justify the search of a passenger.
However, the officers relied on more than defendant's mere presence. When the
officers discovered that defendant had no weapons, they could reasonably infer that
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defendant's furtive movements were an attempt to conceal drugs on his person.
Moreover, the officer conducting the frisk smelled the odor of marijuana on
defendant's person.

These factors, together with the presence of the drug

paraphernalia in the truck, created probable cause to believe defendant was
concealing contraband. The officers were thus justified in extending the automobile
search to defendant. In addition, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant
for drug possession or use. Because the search was contemporaneous with
defendant's arrest, the search of the coin purse was also justified as incident to
arrest.

ARGUMENT
L

THE OFFICERS DID NOT EXCEED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
THE DETENTION BY QUESTIONING THE DRIVER ABOUT HIS
EARLIER PRESENCE AT AN AREA FREQUENTED BY DRUG
DEALERS
Defendant argues that the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the stop

when they continued to question him and Straugh after dispatch reported that
Straugh's driver's license was valid, his registration and insurance were current, and
the two had no outstanding warrants. Aplt. Brf. at 10-14. He contends that rather
than questioning the two, the officers should have permitted them "to proceed on
their way without further questioning." Aplt. Brf. at 11-12. Contrary to defendant's
claim, the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop.
In determining whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court inquires first, whether "the police officer's action [was]
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'justified at its inception/" and second, whether "the resulting detention [was]
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place/" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,19-20 (1968)). In this case, defendant has not challenged the officer's
action in stopping defendant, nor could he. See Aplt. Brf. at 10-17. Officer
Archuletta saw defendant drive through an intersection without stopping at the
stop sign. R. 37: 5-6 (R. 14). As held in Lopez, "[a]n observed traffic violation gives
the officer 'at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic
offense/" 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,882 n.2 (Utah App.
1989)). The only question on appeal, therefore, is whether the ensuing detention
was justified. The district court correctly ruled that it was.
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" Id. (quoting Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983)). In conducting a traffic stop, officers "may request
a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a
citation." Id. But "[o]nce the purpose of the initial stop is concluded,... the person
must be allowed to depart." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125, \ 31,63 P.3d 650. Further
questioning is not justified "unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a further illegality." Id. The officers had that here.
Upon returning to the pickup truck, Officer Anderson questioned Straugh
about his presence at the Riverside Motel parking lot. R. 37:16-17; V3:15:37 (R.15).
This questioning was supported by several factors which, when viewed together,
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created reasonable suspicion that Straugh and defendant may have been involved in
a theft or burglary or some kind of drug transaction. First, both officers were aware
of the two men's prior involvement with drugs and thefts. R. 37: 7, 18-19, 23.
Officer Anderson had "dealt" with both men in the past and "kn[ew] them to be
into narcotics and into burglaries" or thefts. R. 37:7,18-19.4 Officer Archuletta was
likewise aware of their criminal histories involving "[n]arcotics, burglaries, [and]
thefts." R. 37:23. Second, the two men were seen earlier at the Riverside Motel—an
"area, at the time, [officers] were dealing with on an almost daily basis with
narcotics users and dealers." R. 37: 6. Third, defendant was evasive with Officer
Anderson when he first talked to them after making the stop. Defendant "wouldn't
even look at [Officer Anderson] when [he] was talking to him." R. 37:10; V3:12:42.
And fourth, Officer Archuletta had seen them earlier "doing something there at the
driver's door." V3:13:42. This was a significant factor because drugs are often
concealed in car doors. See Bustamante v. State, 917 S.W.2d 144,145 (Tex. App. 1996)
(observing that "[t]he two officers knew from their experience and intelligence
reports that a car door is a place commonly used to conceal contraband"); People v.
Olivas, 859 P.2d 211, 216 (Colo. 1993) (observing that "[a]n experienced law
enforcement officer might reasonably believe that the area behind a loose door panel

From Officer Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing, it appears
that he was aware of the thefts or burglaries only through past criminal histories.
SeeR. 37:17-19.
12

is a likely place to hide contraband while it is being transported on interstate
highways").
The foregoing factors, viewed separately, would not create reasonable
suspicion. However, as recently reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court, "courts may
not use a 'divide-and-conquer analysis/ In other words, courts cannot evaluate
individual facts in isolation to determine whether each fact has an innocent
explanation/' State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 14, 563 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22)).

Instead, "courts must look to the 'totality of the

circumstances' to determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further
investigation by the police officer.'7 Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274 (2002).
Nor may courts insist that the facts and circumstances conclusively
demonstrate that criminal conduct is in fact occurring or about to occur. "[PJrobable
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,243,245 (1983). The
likelihood of criminal activity is even less in the case of reasonable suspicion, "and it
falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.'" Id.
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 14 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). Accordingly, "[a]
determination that reasonable suspicion exists... need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Indeed, "innocent behavior frequently
will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
243,245 n.13 (1983), and, of course, reasonable suspicion as well. All that is required
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is that the officer's suspicion be "supported by specific and articulable facts as well
as any rational inferences drawn from those facts/7 Alverez, 2006 UT 61, % 14.
As demonstrated above, the facts and inferences drawn from those facts
supported such a suspicion. While the conduct and activity of defendant and
Straugh might have been innocent, the converging circumstances and their conduct,
when viewed together, "warranted further investigation" by Officer Anderson. Id.
The questioning of the men in Terry v. Ohio was based on less. The officer in
Terry observed two men standing at the corner of a downtown intersection at 2:30 in
the afternoon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. One of the men walked down the sidewalk past
some stores, then paused for a moment to look into a store window, before
proceeding a short distance farther. Id. at 6. The man then turned around, looked
briefly in the store window again, and rejoined his companion at the corner. Id.
After the two men briefly conversed, the other man followed the same ritual. Id.
Each of the men repeated this conduct five to six times. Id. Although the officer had
no information about the individuals, and observed them do nothing wrong, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the officer was warranted in stopping to
question the men. Id. at 27-28. Observed the Court, "It would have been poor police
work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further."
Id. at 23.
Likewise, it would have been poor police work indeed for Officers Anderson
and Archuletta to have failed to investigate defendant and Straugh further for drug
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involvement Both were known to be involved in drugs, they were seen at an area
where drug activity was a real problem, and they were seen doing something at the
driver's door—a place where drugs are often concealed. Given these facts, the
officers questioning was not based on "an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch/" but rather on specific and articulable facts. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 14.
Defendant argues that the officers were not justified in relying on past
criminal histories of drugs and theft or burglary to support their suspicion and cites
rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, as support. Aplt. Brf. at 13. However, rule 404
applies to actions and proceedings in the courts, not to an officer's analysis of facts
on the scene. See Utah R. Evid. 1101(a).5 Utah courts have questioned whether a
defendant's criminal history may be considered in assessing probable cause. See
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Ranquist, 2005 UT App
482,1 8 n.2,128 P.3d 1201. Those cases, however, should be overruled.
As observed by the Tenth Circuit, "[t]o be sure,... a prior criminal history is
by itself insufficient to create reasonable suspicion." United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d
1120,1132 (10th Cir. 2005). However, "in conjunction with other factors, criminal
history contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus." Id.; accord
United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106,1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that "criminal
history, combined with other factors, can support a finding of reasonable suspicion
or probable cause"). Other courts have likewise recognized that criminal history is

5

Rule 1101 also specifically provides that the rules of evidence do not apply
to search warrants. Utah R. Evid. 1101(b).
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an appropriate factor in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that suspect's "prior
criminal activity or record clearly is material to the probable cause determination");
United States v. Taylor, 985 R2d 3,6 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Sumpter, 669
R2d 1215, 1222 (8th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that "an individuals' prior criminal
activities and record have a bearing on the probable cause determination"). The
United States Supreme Court has also suggested that criminal history is a relevant
and permissible consideration in assessing reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Ybarra v.
Illinois, 4A4L U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (rejecting claim that officers had basis to conduct a
weapons frisk where officers "neither recognized [defendant] as a person with a
criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to
assault them" and did not see him give any "indication of possessing a weapon").
Citing State v. Alexander, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), defendant also
contends that his nervous conduct should be given no weight. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13.
While nervousness alone is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,143 (Utah App. 1997), it is a factor to
be considered with other factors. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, 1 23 (considering
defendant's nervousness in determining whether there was probable cause to
believe he had drugs in his mouth). In any event, defendant was not merely
nervous, but evasive. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
"nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000).
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Defendant also contends that the pickup's location in an area frequently used
to transact drug deals is not a factor. Aplt Brf. at 13. Again, defendant's claim is
contrary to Supreme Court precedent. As observed in Illinois v. Wardlow, "officers
are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. The Court in Wardlow thus relied on the
defendant's presence "in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking," together with his
flight upon seeing the officers, in concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to
stop the defendant for questioning. Id. at 124-26.
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in relying on the officer's
observation of the unhooked amplifier, rolling papers, plastic baggies, and
marijuana pipe, because those items were not observed until after Officer Anderson
began questioning Straugh about his presence at the Riverside Motel. Aplt. Brf. at
14. He also challenges the trial court's finding that these items were found less than
two minutes from the time dispatch verified the license and registration
information. Aplt. Brf. at 15. These complaints, however, are irrelevant because
Officer Anderson's questioning was already supported by reasonable suspicion.
Indeed, these additional observations added to his suspicion, creating the probable
cause necessary to justify a search of the car. See, e.g., State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695
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(Utah App. 1997) (finding probable cause to search car based on officer's
observation of clip, pipe, and marijuana smell).6
II.

THE OFFICER'S ROADSIDE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S COIN
PURSE WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE
PERSONALLY POSSESSED DRUGS
In his final argument, defendant contends that Officer Archuletta was not

justified in opening his coin purse after discovering it in his jacket during the
weapons frisk. Because Officer Archuletta testified that he had no basis to believe a
weapon was contained in the purse, R. 37: 41-42, the State agrees that he was not
justified in opening the purse pursuant to a Terry frisk for weapons. However,
contrary to defendant's claim, the officers had probable cause to believe defendant
had contraband in the purse at the time they opened the coin purse.
The law is well settled that "a person's mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person/' Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added);

6

In any event, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. As
defendant acknowledges, following the license and registration verification, Officer
Anderson began questioning Straugh at approximately 3:15:35 a.m. Aplt. Brf. at 15.
Officer Anderson mentions the amplifier less than a minute later. See v3:16:18-23.
He mentions the rolling papers at 3:17:49 a.m, two minutes and 14 seconds after
initiation of the conversation. v3:17:49. However, Officer Anderson began looking
in the armrest area of the driver side door some 19 seconds earlier, and is clearly
seen looking at the armrest seven seconds earlier. See V3:17:30. Where Officer
Archuletta testified that he saw the rolling papers first and alerted Officer Anderson
of their presence, the trial court could reasonably find that the rolling papers were in
fact observed in less than two minutes.
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accord United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,587 (1948) ("We are not convinced that a
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his
person to which he would otherwise be entitled/'). But the officers here had more.
In addition to the evidence of drug use in the pickup truck and defendant's drug
past, defendant had made furtive movements while talking to Officer Archuletta.
Defendant moved "a black looking basket weave leather" object from one side of the
pocket of his hoody to the other side and refused to identify what it was or remove
his hands from his pocket. R. 37: 24-25, 27-28, 37. Although Officer Archuletta
initially believed the object may have been a weapon, the weapons frisk revealed
that it was not. This revelation in turn supported an inference that defendant was
not attempting to hide a weapon, but drugs. This inference was strengthened when,
in the course of frisking defendant, Officer Archuletta smelled "a real pugnant odor
of marijuana" on defendant's person. R. 37:10.
The foregoing factors created probable cause that defendant was personally
concealing marijuana or other drugs in the coin purse. The fact that the officers may
not have had "specific knowledge" defendant was concealing drugs "is not critical
since 'a police officer is not required to meet any such standard of perfection as to
demand an absolutely certain judgment before he may act.'" State v. Spurgeon, 904
P.2d 220,227 (Utah App. 1995) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the roadside search
of the purse was justified. Because defendant was traveling in a truck on the road, it
was impractical and thus unnecessary for officers to secure a warrant. Accordingly,
the exigencies of the situation justified a search under the automobile exception to
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the warrant requirement. Cf. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (holding that police executing
search warrant on tavern did not have probable cause to extend search to a tavern
patron where patron "made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no
movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing
of a suspicious nature to the police officers").
The facts also created probable cause to support defendant's arrest for
possession or use of marijuana. He smelled of marijuana and a marijuana pipe and
rolling papers were found in the vehicle. See Syurgeon, 904 P.2d at 227 (recognizing
that "'probable cause for arrest may arise from an officer's sense of smell7").
Although the pipe and rolling papers may very well have belonged to Straugh, the
odor of marijuana on defendant, together with his furtive gestures, strongly
suggests that he was using marijuana with Straugh. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-372(1)(ee) (West 2004) (defining "possession" or "use" as "the joint or individual
. . . control..., inhalation,... or consumption" of drugs). As observed in Wyoming
v. Houghton, "a car passenger... will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver." 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999).
The trial court thus correctly ruled that the search of the coin purse was
justified as incident to arrest. The arrest was supported by probable cause, the coin
purse was within defendant's "immediate control," and "the search [was]
conducted contemporaneously to the arrest." State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114,1117-18
(Utah App. 1997). Although the search preceded the arrest, the contemporaneous
requirement is satisfied if the search immediately precedes the arrest "and probable
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cause to effect the arrest . . . exist[s] 'independent of the evidence seized in the
search/" State v. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, f 19,100 P.3d 225. As discussed
above, those requirements were met

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.

ORAL ARGUMENT
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals,
2005 UT 18, f 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
Respectfully submitted December 21, 2006.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

S. Gray
fssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHEL W.DENNIS,
BRIAN GABRIEL STRAUGH

i
;)
>

i
}
Defendant. ]

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO
SUPPRESS
213-10-05 & 212-10-05
Criminal No. 051700285
Criminal No. 051700283

Defendant Straugh moved to suppress evidence by a Motion dated February 14,
2006. The cases on defendant Straugh and defendant Dennis, though charged in
separate criminal Informations, arise out of the same traffic stop. Defendant Dennis joined
in the Motion to Suppress filed by defendant Straugh, and a Suppression Hearing was
conducted on March 20, 2006. Officers Trent Anderson and Lynn Archuleta of the Helper
City Police Department testified at the hearing. The Court, having heard the evidence and
the arguments of counsel, now finds as follows:
On October 18, 2005, at approximately 3:00 a.m. Officer Trent Anderson and
Officer Lynn Archuleta of the Helper City Police Department were on duty and were parked
along SR6 with the driver's side doors next to one another. Officer Anderson observed a
black pick up truck approaching a stop sign on a street which enters SR6. Officer
Anderson noticed that the vehicle did not stop for the stop sign. As the truck passed the
location of the officers, Officer Anderson noticed that the vehicle had a cracked windshield.
Officer Archuleta commented to Officer Anderson that Archuleta had seen the truck earlier
at the Riverside Motel, a location known for unlawful drug activity.

Officer Anderson stopped the truck. He approached the vehicle and found the
driver to be defendant Brian Straugh. The only other occupant of the vehicle was
defendant Michael Dennis. While speaking with Straugh, Officer Anderson detected
extreme nervousness coming from both subjects. Officer Anderson knew both subjects
and had prior knowledge that both had been involved with burglaries, thefts, or narcotic
violations.
Officer Anderson returned to his patrol vehicle to run a license check on Straugh.
Officer Anderson was unable to run the check through the Helper Police Department
because of difficulties with the computer equipment, so he ran the check through Carbon
County Dispatch. Dispatch was slow responding, and roughly eight (8) minutes passed
until Officer Anderson received information from Dispatch that Straugh's license was valid.
During this time, Officer Archuleta had responded to the scene and had proceeded to
Officer Anderson's vehicle.
Immediately upon receiving the license information from Dispatch, both Officers
approached the truck. Officer Anderson asked Straugh if Straugh had been at the
Riverside Motel. Officer Archuleta observed zig zag rolling papers in the driver's door
handle and alerted Officer Anderson. Officer Anderson then saw the papers and also a
green tubular object underneath the papers which appeared to be drug paraphernalia. The
Officers also inquired about an amplifier which was loose on the floor of the vehicle. While
Officer Anderson was speaking with Straugh, Officer Archuleta noticed that Dennis had a
black object with a basket weave pattern which Dennis was attempting to conceal in the
front pocket of a sweatshirt Dennis was wearing. Dennis and Straugh were removed from
the vehicle. Officer Anderson then observed two (2) plastic baggies commonly used to
store narcotics on the floorboard of the vehicle. Dennis was uncooperative about revealing
the black object. Officer Anderson attempted to pat down Dennis. When Dennis
attempted to pull away, Officer Archuleta grabbed the item from his pocket. The object
was a coin purse. Officer Archuleta opened the purse and discovered baggies of
suspected methamphetamine and other contraband.
The video tape from Officer Anderson's patrol vehicle was played during the
Suppression Hearing. The Court took note of times shown on the video. Less than two (2)

minutes elapsed from the time that the Officers received the license response from
dispatch until the Officers noticed in plain view the zig zag papers, green paraphernalia,
and the amplifier.
Based on the aforesaid findings, the Court concludes that Officer Anderson had a
valid reason to make the traffic stop. The delay of roughly eight (8) minutes while Officer
Anderson did a standard driver's license check with Dispatch was not improper. When
Officer Anderson approached the truck for the second time together with Officer Archuleta,
Officer Anderson immediately asked Straugh about being at the Riverside Motel. This
was an improper question and not related to the traffic stop, but Straugh had no need to
answer the question. The Officers had legitimate factors at this juncture for reasonable
suspicion, namely that it was 3:00 in the morning, that they knew the subjects and that the
subjects had criminal histories, that the subjects had been at the Riverside Motel, and that
the subjects were acting nervous. These factors, while being reasons for suspicion, carry
minimal weight. However, the Officers were certainly justified in inquiring about the loose
amplifier based on their knowledge of the defendants' backgrounds, the fact that the
amplifier was not hooked up, and the time of day. Additionally, the Officers also saw the
zig zag papers and the green paraphernalia.
The detention of the subjects was less than two (2) minutes before the Officers had
their reasonable suspicions aroused by the amplifier, the zig zag papers, the green
paraphernalia, and loose baggies on the floor of the vehicle. This brief detention of the
subjects was not an unreasonable extension of time beyond the time needed for issuance
of a traffic citation.
As to the black coin purse in the possession of Dennis, a reasonable, objective
officer would have been justified in pursuing what was in Dennis's sweatshirt pouch. The
black, basket weave object was not unlike the handle of a gun, the handle of a knife, or a
holster for a gun or knife. It was reasonable for Officer Archuleta to insist that the purse be
taken from the sweatshirt pouch.

It was unnecessary for the Officers to secure a Search Warrant to open the purse,
since it was apparent from the evidence that the subjects were going to jail and the
contents of the purse would be discovered either through an inventory or through inevitable
discovery.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions to
Suppress are denied and any contraband found in the vehicle or on defendant Dennis is
admissible at trial.

j

DATED this j j ^ d a y of April, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

